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ABSTRACT 
An Examination of the Short Term Reversal Premium 
by 
Timothy J. Burgess, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2017 
Major Professor: Dr. Tyler J. Brough 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
 
The intent of this study is to explore short-term reversal effects in public securities markets.  
The basis of this study is to take into consideration prior work done by economists, paying 
particularly attention to periods specifically before and after the decimalization of the stock 
market in 2001.  This study finds that from years 1980-2000, there is a monthly return 
premium of -0.0552% or 5.5 basis points, which is quite significant with a t-statistic of 11.08.  
Following decimalization in 2001 through year 2012, this monthly return premium drops 
44% to -0.031% or 3.1 basis points, again with a high t-statistic of 4.50.  Despite these 
findings, the resulting return premium is still quite small in nature and would require large 
capital commitments to realize any type of meaningful return.  Regardless, there inherently 
appears to be an arbitrage opportunity that would pique the curiosity of any rational 
investor and begs to be explored further. 
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Introduction 
The old adage of “what goes up must come down” is well founded on the principal of 
physics and perhaps originally attributable to Sir Isaac Newton and his discovery of the law 
of gravity.  Today, the saying, albeit more colloquial than Newton’s time, is well used and 
certainly has application in financial markets.  The idea of something moving in one 
direction and then reversing back towards its origin has common application to finance in 
what is known as a reversion to the mean.  Reversion to the mean is the theory that prices 
in financial markets will eventually return to an average price point that is readily 
observable from historical data.  Prices will oscillate back and forth around this average and 
any deviation will eventually return to it.  The time it takes to return is an important factor 
as deviations could last for a few seconds, a few days, or even years.  In some cases, a 
reversion may never occur as a positive or negative shift may be attributable to 
fundamental changes in a business and therefore its price will change to accommodate the 
new norm.  Nevertheless, basing one’s trading strategy on mean-reversion principals is 
certainly something every investor should be aware of.   
Employing a short-term month-over-month trading strategy of taking an opposite, 
or reverse, trading position based on the previous month’s return is a well explored trading 
strategy.  These short-term month-over-month trading strategy gains, particularly prior to 
1987, have been well documented and shown to be statistically significant.  Returns have 
been reported to be around 2% per month, or a staggering 24% per annum (Jegadeesh, 
1990).  If one believes as Fama (1970) that markets are efficient and as Hayek (1945) and 
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others that securities follow a Brownian, or martingale, motion, no such predictable and 
observable opportunity should exist, particularly in such a consistent month-over-month 
trading strategy. 
There have been many attempts at explaining the reasoning behind these short-
term stock reversals:  DeBondt and Thaler (1985) argued that these reversals were due to 
over-reactions to information in the market.  Given the widely emotional and behaviorally 
biased nature of investors, particularly the mass of common investors, overreactions are 
certainly bound to take place; more recently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) proposed a 
more technical explanation surrounding a liquidity effect in prices where those who provide 
liquidity to the market earn a premium for doing so; and much prior to them, Cox and 
Peterson (1994) argued that this reversal premium was due largely in part to what is known 
as the bid-ask bounce, which artificially inflates the calculation of variance. 
Exploring further along the lines of Cox and Peterson (1994), this study seeks to 
identify if this short-term reversal premium is still relevant in today’s market; particularly 
with the quick dissemination of news and instantaneous market quotes through electronic 
means and, most specifically, the decimalization of stock market price quotes mandated by 
the SEC in 2001.  Especially interesting in most of these prior papers is that researchers end 
their data collection in 1987, where it has been documented and suggested that a large 
portion of the return reversal premium dissipates for the most part (Cox and Peterson, 
1994). 
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In order to truly capture the full effect of a short term reversal premium, drastic 
swings in prices are ideally captured.  The probability of the price reversing on a stock that 
has experienced a large gain of 10% in a short period is higher than a stock that only gains 
1% given the larger short-term movement in the price.  As stated previously, this price 
movement may be a fundamental change in price due to some event such as a surprise 
earnings announcement or acquisition bid.  If, however, the movement is not attributable to 
a fundamental event, a reversal is more likely but whether the event is fundamental or not 
such events are still prone to price overreactions and bid-ask bounces as observed by 
previous studies. 
The date of October 19, 1987 has come to be known as “Black Monday”, when the 
stock market experienced a very drastic “flash crash”.  After Black Monday, regulators 
rebuilt trade-clearing protocols to bring uniformity to the market.  These same regulators 
also put in place a new rule known as a trading “curb” which is informally known as a market 
circuit breaker.  Much like an actual circuit breaker in an electrical current system, these 
curbs allow exchanges to immediately halt trading in instances of unusually large price 
increases or declines in majorly traded markets.  Beginning at this time, large gains in short-
term reversal strategy trading began to show evidence of dissipation, suggesting a 
correlation with this new regulation. 
This study aims to explore the period particularly before and after the 
decimalization of the stock market.  Prior to 2001, stocks on all major exchanges were 
quoted on a fractional basis.  The smallest price movement that could be quoted was 1/16th, 
4 
 
or 6.25 pennies on the dollar.  When the NYSE was started 200 years ago market quotes 
were based on the same Spanish trading convention with prices denominated on a 1/8th 
basis.  Many financial practices were adopted from the Spanish, including the influence of 
the Spanish silver dollar coin, or reale de a ocho, on the American dollar.  The Spanish silver 
dollar was worth eight reales and was literally divided into eight pieces when change for a 
transaction needed to be made.  From this practice spawns the oft squawked, “pieces of 
eight!” saying mimicked by a pirate’s loyal parrot.  Many conventions in financial markets 
are routed in long-standing traditions as evidenced by US Treasury bonds still being quoted 
on a 1/32nd basis to this day.  Because price movements happened in roughly 6 cent steps, 
order volumes in theory could push prices up and down at a faster pace than if price steps 
were smaller resulting in larger volatility in prices to be captured in a short-term reversal 
trading strategy. 
Decimalization was the process of converting the quoting system of financial 
markets to a decimal basis with the smallest price tic being 1/100, or one cent.  The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission mandated that all stock markets in the U.S. convert to 
a decimal basis by April 9, 2001.  Having prices in financial markets quoted on a one cent 
basis conformed the U.S. to international standards and made it easier for investors to read 
and interpret prices and movements.  Furthermore, with a smaller price step than what was 
previously available in the market, order volumes in theory would have a less drastic effect 
on prices and liquidity would improve given the tighter bid-ask spreads. 
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Data and Methodology 
Daily stock return data from the universe of stocks available from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) during the period 1982-2012 was gathered for this study.  Very small 
cap stocks, less than two dollars (penny stocks), were excluded from the data.  Additionally, 
the book-value of equity was collected from Compustat for stocks that had this information 
available.  This data was used to calculate the book-to-market and market capitalization 
ratios.  The values of equity were controlled to be positive only so that the natural log of 
book-to-market ratios could be computed (variable logBM).  In total, this represents a 
sample size of roughly 1.2 million observations.   
The analysis of the data consisted of three sections: (1) Running Fama-Macbeth 
cross-sectional regressions across the entire time period (Figure 1) using the following 
model: 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞 +
𝛽6𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝜖.   
Where the dependent variable is stock returns in the next month, Rt+1; beta is the CAPM 
beta; logCAP and logBM are the natural logarithm values of market cap and book-to-
market; momentum is the cumulative return from month t-12 to t-2, or momentum 
premium; illiq is the ratio of the absolute value of daily return scaled by volume and average 
to the monthly level, or Amihud illiquidity premium; idiovolt is the idiosyncratic volatility or 
standard deviation of daily residual returns, where residuals are obtained from a daily Fama 
and French 3-factor model (MKTRF, SMB and HML); and return is the current month’s 
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return.  (2)  Breaking the data into two sections surrounding decimalization, 1982 to 2000 
and from 2001 to 2012.  (3) Examining an eight-year spectrum around the 2001 
decimalization in years 1997-2000 and then from years 2001-2004.  And (4), examining a 
little closer spectrum of six years around 2001 from 1998-2000 and then 2001-2003.   
Decimalization was mandated by the SEC to be fully complete by April 9, 2001.  As 
many firms had already begun to switch to decimalization prior to April 2001 beginning in 
September 2000, it will be stated that all of 2001 will be considered post-decimalization.  All 
standard errors and t-statistics in the Fama-Macbeth regressions have been controlled for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by applying a Newey-West (1987) correction using 3 
lags.   
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Results 
Full Period: From the years 1980-2000, there is a monthly return premium of -0.0552% or 
5.5 basis points, which is quite significant with a t-statistic of 11.08.  Following 
decimalization in 2001 through year 2012, this monthly return premium drops 44% to           
-0.031% or 3.1 basis points, again with a high t-statistic of 4.50.  All tables presented are 
comprised of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression means with 3-lag Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics (in parenthesis). 
 1980-2012 
Pre-Decimalization 
(1980-2000) 
 
Post-Decimalization 
(2001-2012) 
 
Intercept 
0.0323 
(5.97) 
0.0322 
(4.73) 
 
0.0326 
(3.64) 
 
Beta 
-0.0006 
(-0.83) 
-0.0005 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.0009 
(-0.57) 
 
LogCAP 
-0.0005 
(-1.26) 
-0.0002 
(-0.37) 
 
-0.0010 
(-2.04) 
 
LogBM 
0.0060 
(10.11) 
0.0071 
(8.62) 
 
0.0041 
(6.38) 
 
Momentum 
0.0052 
(3.47) 
0.0091 
(6.58) 
 
-0.0013 
(-0.44) 
 
Illiq 
0.0001 
(3.20) 
0.0001 
(3.65) 
 
0.0001 
(1.71) 
 
Idiovolt 
0.0146 
(0.37) 
0.0468 
(0.99) 
 
-0.0397 
(-0.56) 
 
Return 
-0.0462 
(-11.01) 
-0.0552 
(-11.08) 
 
-0.0310 
(-4.50) 
 
 
The real return for the most part is small and would require a large amount of 
capital being traded to make any sort of meaningful return.  For example a $10MM dollar 
investment would produce a $37M annualized return representing the need to commit 
large amounts of capital to this strategy, ignoring transaction costs.  Nevertheless, there 
does exist a premium as evidenced by the variable, return, in the model and there is a 
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significant decrease in this variable of 44% from pre to post-decimalization.  This 44% drop 
is significant based on the adjusted t-statistic of 2.84 which is computed from a z-score of 
0.00852 from the standard errors. 
Illiquidity is another important factor to note as represented by illiq.  Prior to 2001, 
the coefficient on illiquidity is 0.0001 and significant and remains at 0.0001 after 2001 but is 
insignificant suggesting that decimalization did indeed play a role in increasing liquidity in 
the market. 
Other factors in the model behave as expected such as a positive value associated 
with book-to-market, logBM, which is highly significant across the entire period and 
decreases slightly from pre to post-decimalization but remains significant.  Although the 
logCAP variable has a negative value associated with market cap, it is insignificant in the 
data pre-2001 and is barely significant after 2001.  This variable changes across time with 
periods of existence (high t-statistics) and periods of almost negligible existence which calls 
into question its reliability in financial modeling, particularly in portfolio creation.   
Finally, the momentum premium, shown in the model as momentum, is positive and 
significant pre-decimalization but is negative and completely insignificant post 
decimalization.  This suggests that momentum, or the observation that stocks with positive 
gains continue to increase and stocks with losses continue to decrease, disappears after 
decimalization.   
Also interesting to note is the average slope on beta, which is the variable for the 
CAPM beta, is negative and statistically insignificant, which goes against the Capital Asset 
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Pricing Model (CAPM) theory.  Contradictions to the CAPM model such as this have been 
shown in many studies previously. 
 
Eight-year Period: Examining results in a smaller window shows that in the four years prior 
to decimalization, the coefficient on return is -0.0572% and significant.  It is important to 
note here that this value is very close to the value over the entire pre-decimalization period 
of -0.0552%.  Examining the result in a four-year window after decimalization shows a 
decrease in the coefficient down to -0.0436%, still significant, which again affirms the 
hypothesis that decimalization played a role in decreasing this result.  This decrease 
represents a change of 23.8% between the four years pre and post-decimalization. 
 
Four Years 
Pre-Decimalization 
(1997-2000) 
 
Four Years 
Post-Decimalization 
(2001-2004) 
 
Intercept 
0.0122 
(0.78) 
 
0.0581 
(4.74) 
 
Beta 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
 
-0.0042 
(-1.92) 
 
LogCAP 
0.0008 
(0.49) 
 
-0.0023 
(-3.19) 
 
LogBM 
0.0055 
(2.13) 
 
0.0052 
(4.57) 
 
Momentum 
0.0074 
(1.94) 
 
0.0003 
(0.08) 
 
Illiq 
0.0002 
(3.05) 
 
0.0002 
(1.35) 
 
Idiovolt 
0.1413 
(0.91) 
 
0.0894 
(0.55) 
 
Return 
-0.0572 
(-3.38) 
 
-0.0436  
(-4.08) 
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Illiquidity again goes from significant to insignificant between the before and after 
periods providing justification for the increase in liquidity in the market post-decimalization.  
The value of book-to-market is still positive but is close to being insignificant in the model in 
the four years prior to decimalization. 
Momentum is once again positive and just barely insignificant pre-decimalization 
and is again quite statistically insignificant in the period four years post-decimalization.  This 
is similar to the findings in the full period results suggesting that perhaps there was still 
some value attributable to momentum prior to decimalization but was decreasing leading 
up to it. 
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Six-year Period: Drilling down a little closer to a six-year window around decimalization 
continues to show the same results although the decline on return post-decimalization is 
reduced to 18%.  The results are still significant with sufficient t-statistics. 
 
Three Years 
Pre-Decimalization 
(1998-2000) 
 
Three Years 
Post-Decimalization 
(2001-2003) 
 
Intercept 
0.0059 
(0.33) 
 
0.0654 
(4.58) 
 
Beta 
0.0008 
(0.33) 
 
-0.0048 
(-1.75) 
 
LogCAP 
0.0006 
(0.34) 
 
-0.0028 
(-3.76) 
 
LogBM 
0.0042 
(1.34) 
 
0.0055 
(3.64) 
 
Momentum 
0.0071 
(1.42) 
 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
 
Illiq 
0.0002 
(2.91) 
 
0.0001 
(1.66) 
 
Idiovolt 
0.2069 
(1.04) 
 
0.1570 
(0.79) 
 
Return 
-0.0604 
(-2.72) 
 
-0.0495 
(-3.75) 
 
 
Similarly to the results above during the eight-year window, illiquidity again goes 
from significant to insignificant between the before and after periods providing justification 
for the increase in liquidity in the market post-decimalization.   
The value of book-to-market is still positive and is now insignificant in the model for 
the three years prior to decimalization but is still positive and statistically significant in the 
three years post-decimalization. 
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Momentum is once again positive and even more insignificant further suggesting 
that any value contributing to return pre-decimalization is decreasing leading up to it and is 
completely insignificant post-decimalization. 
The averages of the time-series slope coefficients can be found in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1 represents the full data-set, or 384 months.  The coefficient on return, β7, for the 
entire period is negative at -0.0462 with a very significant t-statistic of 11.01. 
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Portfolio Creation Considerations 
Many prior papers examining this effect couple their Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
regressions with back-tested portfolio creation and analysis.  For example, Cox and Peterson 
form an equally weighted portfolio of all stocks with at least a 10 percent drop in a single 
day.  Others have formed portfolios based on industry weight or other factors.  For the sake 
of exploring the overall effect of decimalization on this strategy and not on a particular 
concentration, I have not conducted a portfolio analysis segment to be included in this 
report and have thus deferred to essentially an equally weighted market portfolio consisting 
of the universe of stocks available in CRSP.  Conducting such an analysis could help to 
further drill down into specific sectors, industries and asset-weighting in order to truly 
isolate the potential benefits of implementing an actual trading strategy.   
Additionally, portfolio creation can be an important factor in presenting back-testing 
validity but is conditional on time.  By focusing only on a six or eight-year window around 
the decimalization period there will only be 36 to 48 monthly observations in the data which 
is not nearly enough data to produce inference and run statistically sounds tests.  This is 
evidenced by the low, adjusted t-statistics in these periods which are calculated from z-
scores based on standard errors relying on a limited number of observations. 
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Conclusion 
The above results show that there still exists a reversal premium in the market but it has 
been drastically reduced since decimalization.  It has been shown in this study that this 
premium did decrease by 44% after 2001 which suggests that decimalization, which was a 
major material event that changed the fundamental quotation reporting and operation of 
the stock market, is correlated with this decrease.  This finding is demonstrated on a twenty 
four, eight and six-year window centered around decimalization in 2001 and the findings 
have held in all tested periods.  Despite this decline, the data does not show a complete 
disappearance of the reversal premium and still suggests a monthly reversal premium of 3.1 
basis points, or 0.37% per year, and requires additional study to further explain this market 
anomaly. 
As in all economic studies, reliability of these results is based upon the reliability of 
the underlying model.  Much of the explained results could be based on other non-included 
factors represented in the error term.  However, the model used in this study is highly 
similar to that of previous studies, such as Bali, Cakici and Whitelaw (2010) and therefore 
considered to be a satisfactory model for testing this hypothesis. 
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Figure 1.  Summary statistics of the data from 1980-2012. 
 βi Std Error t-statistics Probt DF 
Intercept 0.0323 0.0054 5.97 <0.0001 383.0 
Beta -0.0006 0.0008 -0.83 0.4060 383.0 
LogCAP -0.0005 0.0004 -1.26 0.2073 383.0 
LogBM 0.0060 0.0006 10.11 <0.0001 383.0 
Momentum 0.0052 0.0015 3.47 0.0006 383.0 
Illiq 0.0001 0.0001 3.20 0.0015 383.0 
Idiovolt 0.0146 0.0395 0.37 0.7118 383.0 
Return -0.0462 0.0042 -11.01 <0.0001 383.0 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Full set of data pre and post-decimalization from 1980-2012.  Here the data shows a 
44% decrease in the return coefficient with an adjusted t-stat of 2.84 based on a z-score of 
0.00852.  This table comprised of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression means with 3-lag 
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in parenthesis). 
 1980-2012 
Pre-Decimalization 
(1980-2000) 
 
Post-Decimalization 
(2001-2012) 
 
Intercept 
0.0323 
(5.97) 
0.0322 
(4.73) 
 
0.0326 
(3.64) 
 
Beta 
-0.0006 
(-0.83) 
-0.0005 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.0009 
(-0.57) 
 
LogCAP 
-0.0005 
(-1.26) 
-0.0002 
(-0.37) 
 
-0.0010 
(-2.04) 
 
LogBM 
0.0060 
(10.11) 
0.0071 
(8.62) 
 
0.0041 
(6.38) 
 
Momentum 
0.0052 
(3.47) 
0.0091 
(6.58) 
 
-0.0013 
(-0.44) 
 
Illiq 
0.0001 
(3.20) 
0.0001 
(3.65) 
 
0.0001 
(1.71) 
 
Idiovolt 
0.0146 
(0.37) 
0.0468 
(0.99) 
 
-0.0397 
(-0.56) 
 
Return 
-0.0462 
(-11.01) 
-0.0552 
(-11.08) 
 
-0.0310 
(-4.50) 
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Figure 3. Four years of data pre and post-decimalization.  The concentration of this data is to 
more fully focus on the eight year period surrounding decimalization.  Here the data shows a 
24% decrease in the return coefficient.  This table comprised of Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regression means with 3-lag Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in parenthesis). 
 
Four Years 
Pre-Decimalization 
(1997-2000) 
 
Four Years 
Post-Decimalization 
(2001-2004) 
 
Intercept 
0.0122 
(0.78) 
 
0.0581 
(4.74) 
 
Beta 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
 
-0.0042 
(-1.92) 
 
LogCAP 
0.0008 
(0.49) 
 
-0.0023 
(-3.19) 
 
LogBM 
0.0055 
(2.13) 
 
0.0052 
(4.57) 
 
Momentum 
0.0074 
(1.94) 
 
0.0003 
(0.08) 
 
Illiq 
0.0002 
(3.05) 
 
0.0002 
(1.35) 
 
Idiovolt 
0.1413 
(0.91) 
 
0.0894 
(0.55) 
 
Return 
-0.0572 
(-3.38) 
 
-0.0436  
(-4.08) 
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Figure 4.  Similar to the table above, this table shows three years of data pre and post-
decimalization.  Here the data shows an 18% decrease in the return coefficient.  This table 
comprised of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression means with 3-lag Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics (in parenthesis). 
 
Three Years 
Pre-Decimalization 
(1998-2000) 
 
Three Years 
Post-Decimalization 
(2001-2003) 
 
Intercept 
0.0059 
(0.33) 
 
0.0654 
(4.58) 
 
Beta 
0.0008 
(0.33) 
 
-0.0048 
(-1.75) 
 
LogCAP 
0.0006 
(0.34) 
 
-0.0028 
(-3.76) 
 
LogBM 
0.0042 
(1.34) 
 
0.0055 
(3.64) 
 
Momentum 
0.0071 
(1.42) 
 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
 
Illiq 
0.0002 
(2.91) 
 
0.0001 
(1.66) 
 
Idiovolt 
0.2069 
(1.04) 
 
0.1570 
(0.79) 
 
Return 
-0.0604 
(-2.72) 
 
-0.0495 
(-3.75) 
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